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FDI POTENTIAL AND SHORTFALLS IN THE MED AND CEECS: DETERMINANTS 
AND DIVERSION EFFECTS 
 
Abstract. This paper examines FDI flows (1994-2004) from the EU (and for comparison from the USA and Japan) to 
two neighbouring regions: Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and South Mediterranean (MED) countries. The analysis 
provides circumstantial evidence that the intensification of FDI in CEE, following integration within the EU, has had no 
discernible dampening effect on FDI flows directed to MED countries. This hypothesis is confirmed in several 
empirical analyses. First, a random effect gravity regression for determinants of bilateral FDI flows to a large sample of 
84 developed and developing partners shows that when environmental, institutional and policy variables are included in 
the analysis MED countries are not different from the rest of the sample. Moreover, the actual capital inflow to MED 
economies is not much far from the flow predicted based on the enlarged gravity equation. This suggests that the low 
inflow of FDI to the region might correspond to equilibrium condition considering various distortions that economic 
agents have to face in MED countries. This result is also confirmed by the common trend followed by coefficients 
obtained interacting yearly with regional dummies representing the two areas.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Several analyses point to the worrying fact that Southern Mediterranean countries (MED from 
now) receive relatively little FDI from most other regions in the world including the EU, despite the 
fact that enforcing the economic and financial partnership through the creation of a Free Trade Area 
(FTA) by 2010 was one of the pillars of the Euro Mediterranean partnership (EMP) launched in 
19951. From 1996 there have been several bilateral Association Agreements between the EU and 
each MED aimed at liberalising progressively trade and capital flows. In the meantime, MED 
countries committed themselves to a programme of deep macro- and microeconomic reforms, 
including monetary stabilisation, reduction of public deficit, privatisation of state owned 
enterprises, and the liberalisation of trade and capital flows. As noted, among others in FEMISE 
(2005), the result we observe after ten years of this policy cast serious doubts about the too widely 
accepted assumption that economic liberalization would lead itself to an increase in foreign 
investments and that tariff dismantling has always a positive effect on growth. 
The recent intergovernmental summit celebrating the 10th anniversary of the EMP, and the 
qualified comments that followed, have clearly shown that the expected flows (trade, investment 
and labor) have materialized quite in the opposite direction (i.e. fewer FDIs and more migration) 
(Gallina, 2006). 
Based mainly on EUROSTAT data, section one shows, in fact, that the FDI flow into some 
Southern Mediterranean countries has tended to grow slowly over the 1990s and to decline after 
2000, while it has been booming in Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) in the same period. A first 
glance comparison of FDI trends also suggests that a substitution process might be at work between 
these two competing areas. The main aim of this paper is to investigate whether and why the inflow 
of FDI from the EU to MED countries have tended to level off over the last few years compared to 
                                               
1
 The following link provides detailed information on the EMP: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/. 
 3
CEECs, also touching upon the issue of potential diversion effects due to the EU enlargement. 
Minisey and Nugent (2006) deal with the same question focusing on trade. 
This study adopts the gravity model approach, which has been already applied to studies of 
common determinants of FDI across countries (Brenton et al. 1999). A broad version of the model 
is used though where such traditional factors as proximity and market size do make countries 
attractive locations for FDI, but also policy and institutional variables, often neglected in the 
literature, are crucial. These variables are expected to catch the shortfalls of MED countries at the 
aggregate level: the assumption is that the success of FDI attractiveness of CEECs was mainly due 
to the prospect of EU membership and to the fact that most CEECs have succeeded in attaining both 
institutional and political stability. The institutional environment is caught by proxies of, among 
others, the degree of openness to international trade of the countries involved, the volatility of the 
bilateral nominal exchange rate, the process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced, the capacity of the governments to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, 
the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions, 
the presence of current and capital account restrictions. 
The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. First, the gravity model is estimated with panel 
data techniques based on assembled data on bilateral FDI flows of fourteen European countries and 
two non-EU countries (USA and Japan). We run panel regressions for determinants of bilateral FDI 
outflows into a large sample of 84 developed and developing partners, using many explanatory 
variables for the years 1994-2004 and aggregate country-level data, estimating the model with both 
fixed and random effects (analysis of determinants). This gravity model is used to define a “normal 
pattern” of bilateral FDI flows. Dummy variables are also included for two groups of countries 
(CCEC10 and MED10) to test for a possible regional divergence from this “normal” pattern. 
Interestingly, the results shows that the dummy for MED countries becomes insignificant when 
institutional variables are added to the equation, suggesting that a poor institutional environment 
explains the weakness of this area in attracting capital from abroad. 
Step two implies the use of gravity estimates to perform out-of-sample forecasts for FDI flows of 
some EU countries to some Southern Mediterranean countries, comparing these long term estimated 
flows to actual flows (simulation analysis). The analysis suggests that the stock adjustment might 
have already taken place in the case of CEE, in which case actual and expected flows are not 
strongly misaligned. On the contrary, actual capital flows to MED are much below the expected 
flows. However, the current situation might also correspond to equilibrium condition taking into 
account various types of distortions that economic agents have to face in MED countries. Many 
other conditions which should be present simultaneously such as the level of physical and human 
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capital accumulation, a developed institutional setting, the presence of a competitive industry and 
an appropriate specialization model are lacking in the south Mediterranean area. Moreover, the 
main productions in the region (agriculture or gas and oil) are also not an attractive factor for 
foreign investors. 
Further, we investigate upon the issue of diversion. Here we use the gravity model to assess 
whether changes in FDI flows to CEECs which are economically integrating appear to be associated 
with negative changes in FDI flows to MED. We experiment this by including interaction of 
regional dummies with dummy variables for particular sub-periods: 1994-1998 (transition period), 
1998-2004 (pre-accession period) and for every year of the period under study, checking how 
regional dummies change. The results show that after controlling for institutional variables, MED 
countries follow the same trend as CEECs, suggesting that institutional differences explain not only 
the overall performance of EU FDI to MED, but also their evolution over time.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 gives an overview of the performance of FDI 
in the MED-10 vis-a-vis CEE using descriptive statistics. Section 2 is devoted to the analysis of the 
determinants of FDI within the gravity framework. The results of the panel estimates are presented 
in section 3, whereas section 4 carries out a simulation exercise aimed at comparing the magnitude 
of actual to “normal” value of FDI expected on the basis of the explanatory variables. Section 4 
contains a preliminary test of Diversion of FDI from MED to CEECs. Some final remarks conclude 
the paper.  
 
 
1. EU FDI towards MED vis-à-vis CEECs over the last decade 
 
EU is the main provider of FDI to MED. Between 2001 and 2004, the share of EU25 in MED102 
total inflow was on average about 31%, compared to only 15% for the US. The European presence 
is not equally distributed in the region and in some countries the share is really striking: in Turkey it 
reaches more than 75%, in Morocco 73% (more than 95% in 2001), in Tunisia 65% (EUROSTAT 
data). According to the MIPO database from ANIMA, 59% of the investment projects are coming 
from European investors, essentially France, Spain, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands and 
Germany (Sztejnhorn and de Saint- Laurent, 2004).  
However, as Figure 1 highlights, the shares of EU FDI flows towards MED (on total extra-EU 
flows) show how little these countries have been able to benefit from the recent great expansion of 
this new engine of international integration and growth. There was quite a slow trend of growth 
                                               
2
 Med10 includes all the members of the Euro Mediterranean Partnership, excluding the new EU members, namely 
Cyprus and Malta. CEEC10 include all the new EU member States plus Bulgaria and Romania. 
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over the nineties up to 1997. After that, there were positive signals: an upsurge between 1997 and 
2002 from 5 to 15 billions of USD and from less than 1% to almost 14%. However, after 2002 a 
strong decline has eroded these first achievements: the FDI share halved from almost 14% in 2002 
to 7% in 2004, a reduction amounting to more than 10 billions of USD. Overall, EU FDI never 
exceeded 2 billions of USD per annum during the last two decades and the overall trend over the 
last two decades suggests a substantial stagnation (EUROSTAT data). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The trend observed for EU FDI to CEEC10 over the same span of time is different. It is marked 
by a stronger growth performance and a clearly diverging pattern with respect to MED, especially 
over the last few years. A constant and rapid growth trend has marked this region after 1997, apart 
for the slowdown in world FDI in 2002, which also shot these countries. Unlike the MED, over the 
period 2002-2004 CEEC10 have highly profited of the more positive global trend in FDI recording 
a jump in EU FDI from 6 to 16 % and a doubling of the amount in USD from 3 to 16 billions 
dollars. 
As comparison of the Figure 2 and 3 brings to the fore, even stronger asymmetries are recorded 
if total (intra and extra EU) EU FDI to the world are considered. Between 2001 and 2004 MED10 
share in EU FDI flows has grown but it still represent only 1.4% of total in 2004, almost the same 
as in 2001. A very small percentage compared to the 11 % registered by Latin America (5 % 
registered by MERCOSUR countries) and to the almost 8 % of the new EU member states, which 
are the key actors of the increase in the share of FDI to EU25 from 52 to 61 % between 2001 and 
2004. 
[Figure 2 and 3 about here] 
Also the global breakdown of world FDI outflow between MED and CEECs during the last 
decade provided in Figure 4 clearly shows that the investors' confidence has been mainly oriented 
towards East European countries. After a very slow growth up to 2000, in 2001, the world FDI 
outflows to MED was very volatile. It exceeded USD 13 billions; but then the amount dropped to 
USD 7.2 billions in 2002, climbed back to 11 billions in 2003 to drop again to 10 billions in 2004. 
Over the same period, the new EU member and candidate countries reached peaks of USD 25 
billions in 2002 and almost 30 billions in 2004, starting from only 5 billions in 1994. In terms of 
share, in 2004, the share of MED countries in the FDI world distribution returned to the 1994 level 
(1.5%), whereas over the same period the CEEC10 share increased from 2.5 to almost 5 %, the 
MED amounting to only a quarter of the FDI flows to them (see Figure 4). This was happening in 
spite of the fact that the unit costs of labour (wage per capita/labour productivity), increased only 
very little in the Mediterranean vis-à-vis the new EU member states (UNCTAD data, 2005).  
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[Figure 4 about here] 
These figures uncover an important stylised fact of FDI flows to this area: their extreme 
volatility. They have an erratic trend: the peak in 2001 and the fall again in 2002 was not due to a 
lack of confidence in these markets following September 11, but mainly to the privatisation of the 
Moroccan telecom to Vivendi Universal. Direct capital flows show, therefore, a feature similar to 
portfolio capital flows: they fluctuate heavily year by year as a result of a strong influence of 
privatisation plans and investment opportunities in the primary sector, especially in hydrocarbon 
sectors and natural gas, which still attract the largest shares of FDI to the producing countries of the 
region (Syria, Egypt, Algeria above all) and also in those of primary resources.  
This structural feature of FDI in the area vanishes one of the crucial factors that determine the 
great potential for foreign investment in creating growth and spillovers, i.e. the fact that they have a 
higher duration, are more stable and can be influenced with respect to the more destabilising 
financial investment. 
The signing of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995 reinforced the commitment of MED 
countries to sound macroeconomic policies and economic reforms and improved the environment 
for FDI. Some measures have been adopted under the Euro Mediterranean Partnership to create new 
opportunities for investment. In-depth reform of indirect taxation, so as to reduce fiscal pressure on 
foreign trade, opening up of financial intermediation activities to competition and scaling down of 
public sector involvement in this field, support for privatisation. 
However, the hypothesis that this paper intends to address is that macroeconomic measures alone 
were unable to affect the confidence of foreign investors. In fact, restructuring and privatisation 
projects have been carried out within a political framework characterised by wars and civil conflicts 
and poor economic governance. The surge of radical Islamism (particularly in Algeria, but not 
only), a phenomenon which might have offset all the gains in environmental conditions for foreign 
investment derived from macroeconomic reforms, political instability and lack of a stable and 
systematic approach to encourage foreign capitals by the governments was also crucial. The often-
identified issues such as lack of transparency and public accountability, the limited size of national 
markets, the still significant trade barriers within the region, the low rate of return to foreign 
investment in the region – the lowest in the world – and inadequate social and physical 
infrastructures (eg education and transport) diminish the attractiveness of the region. Electricity per 
capita, telecom and internet penetration rates are relatively poor. There are also under-developed 
financial sectors (eg. central and private banking infrastructures) that impede the mobilization and 
channelling of funds. Besides skilled labour is scarce.  
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Therefore, although these economies have been subject to stringent structural adjustment 
programs for the biggest part of the 1990s, however, the positive impact this should have had on 
FDI has been offset by persistence of red tape, bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption in the public 
sector, on the one hand, and social and political instability, on the other.  
The increased competition for a limited volume of available FDI resources exerted by Eastern 
Europe countries, with a more qualified workforce and a closer geo-strategic position to the central 
European countries (including the prospect to join the EU themselves one day) has also played a 
part. The FDI situation has further deteriorated in the end of the 1990s when the Eastern European 
countries opened up their economies and entered a transition process which brought some of them 
into the European Union in the medium term: the highly educated, cheap labour force (the average 
hourly wage of a Polish skilled worker was in 1993 around half that of a Moroccan’s and a third of 
Tunisian’s, according to calculations made by the World Bank) and the extensive industrial tissue in 
those countries, as well as the prospects for full market integration with Europe became a decisive 
attraction factor for European FDI, detracting from the FDI-attractiveness of Southern 
Mediterranean countries.  
While MED and CEE countries might be seen as comparable in terms of the wage and education 
level of labour, the adhesion process has made the latter a much more stable region and one with 
enhanced growth perspectives. Moreover, with EU membership, uncertainty about the completion 
of economic transition has been strongly reduced. Overall, therefore, these groups of countries are 
different not only because their specialisation, qualification, level of human capital would be 
different, but mainly because of the drastic change in expectations on future development induced 
by the speed and effectiveness with which the EU carried out pre-entrance reform and the 
admission process.  
The issue of FDI diversion between these two areas so close geographically is obviously one 
highly disputed. The adoption of drastic reforms and market oriented policies in the CEECs, in 
addition to a strong endowment of a cheap and qualified labour force have raised the issue whether 
investment flows previously destined for the relatively cheap labour markets of MED countries, and 
also to some South European countries, may have been diverted to CEE (see Baldwin et al., 1997). 
Previous studies of determinants EU FDI in the MED area (Alessandrini and Resmini, 1999; 
Altomonte and Guagliano, 2003; Alessandrini, 2001; Di Mauro, 2000) have used sophisticated tools 
of analysis as well as firm and sector level data, to test whether a re-orientation towards the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe had taken place over the nineties, when these now New EU 
Members have increasingly become the destination for considerable amounts of FDI. These studies 
generally reached the conclusion that no FDI diversion took place.  
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2. EU FDI determinants within the gravity framework 
 
This paper asks again the question of reorientation using a gravity framework. Moreover, it 
investigates the possible reasons of the low attractiveness of the MED area compared to CEE and, 
in particular, the role played by distortions of an institutional and policy type that economic agents 
have to face in the MED area. Further, this study attempts to measure the degree of misalignment 
between the potential and the actual FDI in the two competing areas and whether this has increased 
over the last few years due to the CEECs competition.  
This section introduces the gravity model approach, which has been already applied to studies of 
FDI as a means of picking up the common determinants of FDI flows across countries (see, for 
instance, Eaton and Tamura, 1996; Brenton and Di Mauro, 1999). This study differs from previous 
studies, among other reasons, because it uses a large data bank and an enlarged version of the 
gravity equation so as to include institutional variables.  
The traditional theory of FDI tries to explain why firms choose to produce abroad instead of 
simply servicing the markets via exports. After all, multinational companies (MNCs) experience 
additional costs in producing abroad: higher costs in placing personnel abroad, communication 
costs, language and cultural differences, informational costs on local tax laws and regulations, costs 
of being outside domestic networks; they also incur higher risk, such as the risk of exchange rate 
changes or even of expropriation by the host country.  
One theoretical approach, introduced by Dunning (1977, 1981), namely the so-called “OLI 
framework”, considers FDI as determined by Ownership, Location and Internalisation advantages 
which the MNC holds over the foreign producer; when these advantages outweigh the above costs, 
FDI arises. The so-called “New Theory of FDI” takes inspiration from the OLI approach and refers 
mainly to the Ownership and Location advantage to introduce MNCs in general equilibrium 
models, where they arise endogenously. The early literature (Helpman 1984, Helpman and 
Krugman 1985) was mainly able to explain ‘vertical FDI’, i.e. investment that takes place in order 
to take advantage of differences in relative factor endowments (hence in factor prices) across 
countries. Instead, what is observed among developed countries is mainly ‘horizontal’ FDI, because 
similar types of production activities, owned by MNCs, take place in different countries. This 
phenomenon is better clarified if multinational activity is not driven by factor endowments 
differences, but rather by the trade-off between proximity and concentration (Brainard 1993), which 
constitutes the starting point of the more recent literature. The proximity advantage stems from 
‘firm-level’ economies of scale, whereby R&D activity (or any other type of ‘knowledge capital’) is 
transferable to affiliates and allows MNCs to be closer to the foreign market. The concentration 
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advantage derives from traditional ‘plant-level’ economies of scale, which make it more profitable 
to concentrate production in one location and then export. Whenever the former outweigh the latter, 
foreign investment will take place, and this will be more likely the higher are intangible assets 
relative to fixed costs of opening up an affiliate and the higher are transportation costs, which are 
assumed to be positive and an increasing function of geographical distance in this model. This 
allows for horizontal FDI, where two-way investment between similar countries occurs, both in 
terms of absolute and relative factor endowment.  
When we get to the empirical analysis, and we want to be able to compare ‘attractiveness’ across 
countries and explain the geographic distribution of FDI we need a model that can pick up its 
common determinants. In order to synthesise the two approaches discussed above, i.e. Helpman and 
Krugman’s treatment of vertical FDI and Brainard’s treatment of the horizontal one, the empirical 
model will include the following main variables: a measure of the ‘economic space’ between the 
two countries, given by the sum of the two GDPs and by the two country’s populations. These 
variables are included to catch the ‘market-seeking’ aspect of FDI, i.e. when investors produce 
abroad to sell in the host market and increase their market shares there. Then, additional dummy 
variables include distance, a common language, a common land border, or preferential trade 
agreements, all factors that may reduce the (transaction and transportation) costs of locating abroad. 
An index of countries’ similarity in size (their relative GDP) measures the relative factor 
endowments.  
To sum up, factors such as proximity and market size should make countries attractive locations 
for FDI. Therefore, in the formulation of the gravity model, the volume of FDI (flows) is mostly 
explained by the size of the market, proxied by GDP, by the country’s population and by the 
distance. 
However, moving from the consideration that the attractiveness of CEECs was greatly 
influenced by the prospects of EU membership and by the fact that most CEECs have succeeded in 
attaining both institutional and political stability, we attempt to explain FDI shortfalls of MED at 
the aggregate level enlarging the traditional gravity model so as to include policy and institutional 
factors such as belonging to a Regional Trading Agreement, using the same currency, and also the 
level of governance of the host country, the existence of Regional Trading Agreement, openness of 
a country for foreign trade, size and level of development of the financial system, volatility of the 
bilateral nominal exchange rate, currency union, governance, central planning, regional trading 
arrangement, human capital endowment. The underlying hypothesis that this study wishes to test is 
that all this institutional factors might explain the poor performance of MED countries. 
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The model is estimated with panel data techniques based on assembled panel data on bilateral 
FDI flows of EU-143 and two non EU countries (USA and Japan). For each of these countries, we 
run both fixed and random effects panel regressions for determinants of bilateral FDI flows 
aggregate country-level data into a larger than ever before sample of developed and developing 
partners4 for the years 1993-2004.  
The formal equation we estimate is the following:  
 
ln (Bilat FDIijt) =  
 
traditional gravity variables: β0 + β1 ln SUMGDPijt + β2 ln POPit + β3 ln POPjt +β4 
lnDiffGDPPCijt +β5 Distij + β6 Distij2 +β7 ln Areasij + β8 LL0ij+ β9 LL1ij + β10 Borderij +  β11 
Langij + β12Colonialij +  
 
policy and institutional variables: + β13 Regionalijt + β14 ln (IMP/GDP)jt + β15 ln (M2/GDP)jt 
+ β16  ERVijt + β17 CUijt  + β18 Govijt  + β19 FTAijt +β20 Humcapjt +β21 Current + β22 Capital 
+  
regional and time dummies: + β23 EU + β24 MED+ β25 CEECs + β26 YEARDummies  
 
As indicated by the form of the above equation, the model is log-linear where: i and j denote 
donor and host country respectively, t denotes time, and the variables are defined as follows:  FDIij 
is the value of the FDI flow from country i (home country) to country j (host country), SUMGDPijt 
is the sum of nominal value of the gross domestic product in the host country e in the donor 
country, POPi and  POPj, is the population of i and j, DiffGDPPCijt is the absolute difference in per 
capita income between i and j (a proxy for relative factor endowment), Distij is the Great Circle 
Distance between i and j in miles, which is taken also as squared distance because we expect a non 
linearity in the FDI behaviour with respect to distance, Areas is the sum of the areas of i and j in 
square kilometres (hence a proxy for distance within the country to the border), LL0ij is a dummy 
variable, which is 0 if no countries are landlocked, 1 if one partner is landlocked, LL1ij is a dummy 
variable, which is 0 if no countries are landlocked, 1 if both partners are landlocked, Borderij is a 
binary variable, which is 1 if i and j share a border and 0 otherwise, Langij is a binary variable, 
which is 1 if i and j share an official language and 0 otherwise, colonial is is a binary variable, 
which is 1 if i colonized j. 
                                               
3
 Belgium was excluded. 
4
 The sample of the host countries is made up of 84 countries, including 46 OECD countries, the non OECD countries 
belonging to the CIS, to the Balkan area, to the south Mediterranean area, to the Central and East European area. 
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The variables from this on are non-standard variables, to capture policy and institutional factors: 
Regionalijt is a binary variable, which is 1 if i and j belong to a Regional Trading Agreement in year 
t, IMP/GDP a proxy for the openness of a country to foreign trade, M2/GDPj is the share of broad 
money to GDP in the host country a measure of the size and level of development of the financial 
system, ERVijt is the volatility of the bilateral nominal exchange rate between i and j in period t, 
CUijt is a binary variable, which is 1 if i and j use the same currency at time t, Govit is the sum of the 
governance indices of j at t, FTA is a dummy variable measure of trade diversion defined as 1 if 
only one of the countries is in a regional trading arrangement (and 0 otherwise), HUMAN is a proxy 
for human capital measured by the percentage of people enrolled in secondary education of the 
corresponding age, CURRENT and CAPITAL are variables coded 0 if host country has no current 
and capital account restrictions, at time t, 1 if host country has, MED is a dummy variable which is 
1 when host countries are MED countries, CEECs is a dummy variable equal 1 when host countries 
are CEEC countries, EUij is a dummy variable for EU membership of the host country (1 for EU 
members), εijt is the error term. We also add a time trend (year) as data on FDI flows at which we 
are looking here may be considerably biased upward or downward in a particular year. For instance, 
a large merger and acquisition deal has taken place or a substantial portion of the domestic 
corporate sector has been privatised. Therefore, there is a great instability in the coefficients over 
time and year dummies are introduced to solve this problem. Source of all variables is reported in 
Appendix I. 
The governance indicator deserves a special attention. Govj is a broad measure capturing: (1) the 
process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (2) the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (3) the respect of citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions. These three 
dimensions of governance are built on the basis of six different subindicators as suggested and 
constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (2002) based on subjective indicators taken 
from the International Country Risk Guide. The six different indicators – Voice and Accountability, 
Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of 
Corruption – were combined into a single index. Since the various indicators make use of somewhat 
different scales, they were also standardized into a similar scale. 
Theoretical reasoning supports the following expectations for the signs of the estimated 
coefficients. Larger markets are expected to attract more FDI, and the coefficients on GDP, sum of 
GDP and population should represent the economic space variable and thus be positive. 
Furthermore, it may be expected that firms will tend to prefer FDI to exports as trade costs, proxied 
by distance, rise, therefore we should find a positive sign on distance. However, a negative 
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coefficient on the distance variable might be expected since the costs of operating overseas affiliates 
are likely to rise as the distance from their domestic central headquarters increases. Overall, the 
effect of distance might be non-linear and, specifically, u-shaped: in other words, a negative 
coefficient of the first derivative and a positive coefficient for the second derivative of distance 
would support the hypothesis of a substitution effect from trade to FDI with increasing distance. 
Vice-versa, an inversely u-shaped effect of distance would suggest the existence of 
complementarities between trade and FDI also with increasing distance. Differences in relative 
endowments (DiffGDPPC) have also an ambiguous sign: vertical FDI (equivalent to inter-industry 
trade), emerges as countries greatly differ in their factor composition – hence showing a positive 
coefficient, while horizontal FDI (comparable to IIT) is determined by similarity in factor 
composition, therefore displaying a negative coefficient. The traditional variables we consider such 
as areas, not being land locked, having a common border, common language, ex-colonial links, 
belonging to a regional trading agreement are expected to have a positive impact.  
Following Brenton et al. (1999), this model also takes into account the ratio of a country’s GDP 
devoted to imports (IMP/GDP)j, a proxy for the openness of a country to foreign trade, on which 
we expect a positive coefficient. As for the size of the financial system, we would expect countries 
with more developed financial systems to be relatively more attractive for FDI. Exchange rate 
volatility might have a positive impact if FDI are a way to escape instability of export earnings due 
to exchange rates variations. Sharing a common currency, having a high governance index, should 
have a positive impact alike the human capital coefficients. The coefficients for Current and Capital 
deficit are expected to be negative. 
Regional should be positive and significant as according to the theory trade liberalisation 
enhance investment in the integrated area due to reduced transaction costs and to liberalisation of 
financial flows. The sign of the variable participating in a FTA is ambiguous: if positive, it would 
suggest no FDI diversion effect.   
 
3. Empirical results 
 
Here we present the results of regression analysis of bilateral FDI flows by major investing 
countries over 1994-2004. The gravity model introduced is used to define a "normal pattern" of 
bilateral FDI flows. Dummy variables are included for three groups of countries EU, CEECs, 
MED10 to get a preliminary test for possible divergence from this “normal” pattern. If the 
corresponding coefficients are significant and negative, this is evidence that the group has received 
less FDI than other countries, after controlling for all the other factors. Therefore, the group 
concerned can expect to benefit from further large FDI inflow as foreign investors adjust their 
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stocks to the new opportunities created by economic transformation. If the dummies are not 
significant, the future growth of the FDI flows can be expected to be in line with changes in the 
determinants of FDI. 
First we focus on few basic variables at the core of gravity models: sum of GDP (a measure of 
mass), Population, Distance (measure of transport and transaction costs). In Table 1, the results of 
this base model and of the enlarged model are presented. A Houseman test cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the coefficients based on fixed effect estimates are the same as those based on 
random effect estimates, which allows us to focus on the latter. 
The gravity variables in the basic model have all the expected sign. Increased economic space 
(SUMGDP and Population) has a statistically significant impact on FDI. Elasticity of bilateral FDI 
with respect to population is larger than 1. Distance appears to harm FDI something that is more 
intuitive in the case of exports. However, there is a non linear relationship: squared distance has a 
positive coefficient, confirming theoretical reasoning according to which firms tend to prefer FDI to 
exports as trade costs, as proxied by distance, rise. More distant markets will tend to be served by 
overseas affiliates rather than by exports. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Differences in relative factor endowments have a negative impact on FDI; from the theoretical 
discussion above one can infer that, on average, EU investors are in general more prone to 
horizontal than to vertical FDI. 
All these results support the expected signs of the variables and in almost all cases are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The variables most significant are those crucial for 
gravity model based on GDP (a measure of mass), Distance and Areas (measures of transport and 
transaction costs).  
From the point of view of this paper, it is interesting to observe that the coefficient for the MED 
countries is negative and significant at 10%, CEECs is positive but not significant, EU is positive 
and significant at 1%. This suggests that while ceteris paribus intra-EU FDI flows are higher than 
average, those with CEE are just average, whereas those to MED countries are lower than average. 
Now, we move to the “enlarged gravity” model results. As expected, Border, Language, 
Regional agreement, currency union all have positive and significant effects on FDI levels. 
FTA has a not significant effect, indicating that for the full sample there has been no discernible 
trade diversion effect of FTAs. Colonial links are not significant too alike the import on GDP 
coefficient. Volatility of exchange rate is positive and significant which might suggest that FDI are 
more stable and less risky than portfolio and trade activities when exchange rate movements are 
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strong. Governance is highly significant with positive sign. Current and capital account restrictions 
are both negative and highly significant. 
It is interesting to observe that after introducing these policy, environmental and institutional 
variables, the coefficients for regional dummies change in a quite interesting way. The MED 
dummy is no more significant suggesting that all the negative difference with respect to other 
countries is caught by the additional variables. The EU dummy is not significant any more which 
might suggest that the future growth of intra-EU FDI flows will be in line with changes in the 
determinants of FDI. The CEE dummy, instead, becomes negative and significant: the group has 
received less FDI than expected as “normal” after controlling for the value assumed by the 
additional determinants of FDI. 
 
4. Simulations for selected countries 
 
This section proposes a simulation analysis aimed at computing the ratio of the expected, taken 
as “normal” or potential level of FDI inflow from each EU country to each MED and CEE country 
(based on the model enlarged to include institutional variables) divided by the actual FDI flow for 
the same couples of countries. Our hypothesis is that if the actual FDI flow is above (below) the 
average level normally expected for countries with comparable characteristics (a ratio lower than 
one), a reduction (increase) of actual FDI has to be expected. 
In the case of MED, based on the very poor performance shown in section 1, one would expect 
that the actual stock of FDI to MED be below its potential or equilibrium level (a ratio higher than 
one) and that some kind of adjustment towards equilibrium has still to take place. 
However, another possible outcome could be also found. Although not corresponding to an 
optimal allocation of resources, the current FDI performance of MED might also correspond to 
equilibrium taking into account the distortions of various type that economic agents have to face in 
the MED area and to the fact that these economies are still too underdeveloped as compared to 
average industrialised countries. In that case, actual flows would not be below the expected level 
and the current situation would suggest that MED have reached some kind of equilibrium although 
of low level. There would be in other words both low performance and low “potential” with some 
MED countries even showing performance “above their potential”, as actually suggested by the 
UNCTAD measurement of FDI performance and potential index in these countries (UNCTAD, 
2004). This hypothesis would be consistent with the behaviour of the MED dummy coefficient in 
the estimates of the previous section after introducing the institutional and policy variables. In this 
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case, removing institutional and policy distortions in MED economies might play a crucial role to 
move out of this low level “equilibrium trap”. 
For shortness sake, the Figures 5 and 6 propose calculations of the ratio of potential to actual 
FDI for only two EU investors, Italy and Germany, towards four MED countries5. The figures show 
that the considered MED attracted almost 100% of the total expected FDI inflow. There was a 
downward shift in inflows for Israel as opposed to a slight increase for Egypt and Morocco, but 
overall there was a stable pattern over the entire decade and no noticeable gap between actual and 
forecasted FDI. In Egypt, the forecasted FDI from Italy has increased over the decade, becoming 
40% higher than the actual value, while in Israel the opposite took place with forecasting 
approaching 100% from 120% in 1994. These results seem to suggest that the stagnant behaviour 
shown by the FDI inflow to MED economies over the last years might persist also in the future if 
the institutional and policy environment does not change in any remarkable way. Omitted results 
suggest, instead, that further FDI expansion to CEE might take place. 
[Figure 5 and 6 about here] 
 
5. Diversion of FDI from MED to CEECs? 
 
This section aims to study the evolution over time of the bilateral distribution of the FDI flow to 
the MED and CEE regions and to assess whether the increasing integration of CEECs in changes in 
the FDI outflow from the EU is associated in any way with changes in FDI flows to MED. In other 
words, we aim to test whether increasing CEE integration in the EU over the second half of the 
1990s, culminating into the EU accession for most of them, has had any noticeable negative impact 
upon FDI flows from EU countries to the MED106.  
We experiment this by including in the enlarged model of Table 1 interactions of regional with 
time dummies both for particular sub-periods: 1994-1998 (transition period), 1998-2004 (pre-
accession period) and for every year from 1994 to 2003. In case of diversion, one would expect that 
ceteris paribus the coefficients relative to CEE would increase, whereas that to MED economies 
would reduce. 
We find a negative and significant time regional interaction dummy for CEECs both in 1994-
1998 and in 1999-2004. For MED the dummy interacting with time is negative and significant for 
the first period but not significant and positive in the second period. In other words, MED countries 
                                               
5
 Similar results relative to other countries are available on request from the authors. 
6
 This methodological approach is based upon that of Sapir (1997) who sought to identify whether a domino effect had 
characterised the impact of European integration upon bilateral trade flows with EU of countries not integrated such as 
Portugal, Spain, Finland, Austria and Sweden.  
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were receiving substantially less FDI than could be expected on the basis of their incomes and 
proximity to the EU and to other variables in the 1994-1998. However, the magnitude of this 
‘underpotential’ weakened in the late 1990s and in the first half of the 2000s, which seems to 
suggest that the Eastward enlargement did not adversely affect the magnitude of inward FDI to 
MED economies.  
Figure 7 reports the coefficients of these interacted dummies each year from 1999 to 2003. There 
seem to be a clear positive trend for both groups of countries, which suggests that they were able to 
catch up with the world increase in the degree of capital market integration. This is circumstantial 
evidence that the intensification of FDI in CEE, following integration within the EU, has had no 
discernible dampening effect on FDI flows directed to MED countries. 
[Figure 7 about here] 
In turn, this suggests that once one controls for the institutional difficulties of MED economies, 
they show a trend similar to CEE. This seems to confirm the findings of previous sections according 
to which internal institutional specificities fully explain the shortfalls of MED countries in attracting 
direct investment from abroad in recent years. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Considering the high growth rates and relative monetary stability that the MED region has 
recently achieved and the favourable projections for the future, its FDI attractiveness should be on 
the rise. Nonetheless, the evidence goes right in the opposite direction, since the FDI inflow to the 
area is low and stagnant. This paper has investigated the reasons why this might be so. Two 
possible and competing explanations have been considered of which one is internal and the other is 
external to the area. The former hypothesis is that it is necessary to modify the business 
environment and the behaviour of enterprises in this area and also the role of anchorage, which the 
EU should play in this process. The latter hypothesis is that CEECs offered a more promising long 
term prospect due also to the perspective of EU accession and consequent guarantee that the process 
of regulatory and institutional reforms would not undergo any reversal.  
The paper addresses the issue by examining FDI flows (1994-2004) from the EU (and for 
comparison from the USA and Japan) to the two neighbouring regions of CEE and of the South 
Mediterranean. The analysis provides circumstantial evidence that the intensification of FDI in 
CEE, following integration within the EU, has had no discernible dampening effect on FDI flows 
directed to MED countries. This hypothesis is confirmed in several empirical analyses. First, a 
random effect gravity regression for determinants of bilateral FDI flows to a large sample of 84 
developed and developing partners shows that when environmental, institutional and policy 
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variables are included in the analysis MED countries are not different from the rest of the sample. 
The institutional environment is caught by proxies of, among others, the degree of openness to 
international trade of the countries involved, the volatility of the bilateral nominal exchange rate, 
the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, the capacity of the 
governments to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, the respect of citizens and the 
state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions, the presence of current and 
capital account restrictions. 
Moreover, the actual capital inflow to MED economies is not much far from the flow predicted 
based on the enlarged gravity equation. This suggests that the low inflow of FDI to the region might 
correspond to equilibrium condition considering various distortions that economic agents have to 
face in MED countries. Finally, this result is also confirmed by the common trend followed by 
coefficients obtained interacting yearly with regional dummies representing CEE and the South 
Mediterranean.  
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Figure 1. FDI out from EU to CEEC10 and MED10 
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Source: Own elaboration on EUROSTAT, Economics and Finance Statistics, 2005. 
 
 
Figure 2. EU outflow of FDI (in % of total EU and extra-EU): 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration on EUROSTAT, Economics and Finance statistics, 2005. 
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Figure 3. EU outflow of FDI (in % of total EU and extra-EU): 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaborations on EUROSTAT, Economics and Finance statistics, 2005. 
 
Figure 4.  World FDI to CEEC10 and MED10 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
M
ill
io
n
s 
US
 
do
lla
rs
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
5
%
Med10 CEEC10 Med10 (% world FDI) CEEC10 (% world FDI)
 
Source: Own elaborations on UNCTAD, 2005. 
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Figure 5. IDE outflow from Italy: simulated over observed values in % 
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Source: Own elaboration on model (2) in Table 1. 
 
 Figure 6. IDE outflow from Germany: simulated over observed values (in %) 
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Source: Own elaboration on model (2) in Table 1. 
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Figure 7. The evolution of country effects over time 
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Source: Own elaboration on model (2) in Table 1. 
 
Tab. 1.  
 
Source: Own elaborations. 
 
Random-effects GLS regression 
between = 0.4477, overall = 0.4644       between = 0.5403, overall = 0.5708       
lfdi Coeffic. Std. Err. z P>z Coeffic. Std. Err. z P>z 
lgdpsum -0,115 0,007 -15.29 0.000 0,110 0,041 2,680 0.007
lpop 0,859 0,055 15.59 0.000 1,068 .0581647 18,370 0.000
lpopdonor 1,304 0,064 20.20 0.000 1,181 0,066 17,830 0.000
diffgdppc -0,903 0,048 -18.72 0.000 -0,314 0,052 -5,960 0.000
dist. -3,99E-07 6,29E-08 -6.35 0.000 -3,24E-07 6,29E-08 -5,600 0,000
dist. sqred 2,32E-14 4,06E-15 5,72 0.000 1,76E-14 4,06E-15 4,780 0,000
dummy EU 0,648 0,153 5,16 4,22 -0,130 0,148 -0,880 0,377
Dummy MED10 -0,562 0,314 -1.79 0.073 -0,306 0,147 -1,130 0,181
Dummy CEEC10 0,077 0,252 0.31 0,758 -0,402 0,218 -1,840 0,066
Log area -0,215 0,040 -5,430 0,000
Land locked 1,098 0,702 1,560 0,118
Land locked two -0,149 0,176 -0,850 0,274
Common border 0,874 0,315 2,780 0,006
Common language 0,951 0,327 2,900 0,004
Regional integration agreement 0,293 0,071 4,120 0,000
Ex colonial linkages 0,674 0,462 1,460 0,145
Import/GDP 0,002 0,002 1,320 0,187
Exchange rate volatility 0,224 0,021 10,560 0,000
Governance 0,069 0,004 18,290 0,000
Current account restrictions  -0,187 0,044 -4,240 0,000
Capital account restrictions -0,081 0,046 -1,780 0,075
Currency union participation 0,434 0,059 7,310 0,000
Participation of a country to a free trade area 0,054 0,051 1,050 0,294
_cons -27,60 1,496 -18,44 0 -33,250 1,463 -22,740 0.000
Wald chi2(9)       =   1072.52
 Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
 Number of groups   =       718
R-sq:  within  = 0.2382            
Wald chi2(23)       =   2063.71
 Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
 Number of groups   =       753
R-sq:  within  = 0.1169,             
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Appendix I. Source of data 
 
Data on FDI were taken from EUROSTAT, Economics and Finance Statistics. Data based on 
GDP, POP, Area and M2 were taken from the World Bank’s 2005 World Development Indicators’ 
(WDI’s) CD-Rom. Data on LL, Border, Lang, Colonial, CU, are own elaboration on information 
from Geographical Atlas and from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) website 
(http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html). Distance taken in metres and expressed 
as the great circle distance calculated by J.A. Byers and available at 
www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/lat-long.htm. The variables Regional and FTA were constructed on 
the basis of information about the recognized trade agreements obtained from the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTOs) website (www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/eif_e.xls). Exchange rate 
volatility between countries i and j at time t (ERV) was calculated as the standard deviation of the 
logarithm of the bilateral monthly nominal exchange rate (using the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) 2006, in the five years preceding the date of the bilateral FDI observations). 
Restrictions on payments for capital transactions and Restrictions on payments for current 
transactions were taken from IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions. The governance indicator is built on the basis of six different subindicators as 
suggested and constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (2002) based on subjective 
indicators taken from the International Country Risk Guide (see the following note). These data are 
published in the WB, Governance indicators, 1994-2004, available now on line at 
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata. 
Data on governance components was taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
produced by the Political Risk Services (PRS) group, where the components of the political risk 
index were used, which report subjective assessments of the factors influencing the business 
environment in the countries studied. Several of these components were, in turn, based on 
additional sub-indicators. Specifically, Voice and Accountability was based on two subcomponents 
from ICRG data: Military in Politics and Democratic Accountability, “Political Stability” was based 
on one, Internal Conflict, “Government Effectiveness” on both Government Stability and 
Bureaucratic Quality; “Regulatory Quality” on Investment Profile, “Rule of Law” on Law and 
Order, and “Control of Corruption” on Corruption.  The ICRG data has two very desirable features: 
(1) its large sample of developed and developing countries (130+), and (2) its length of coverage 
over time (1982-current). The ICRG data depends on polls of experts. The central advantage of 
polls of experts is that they are explicitly designed for cross-country comparability, and great effort 
is put in the benchmarking process to ensure this. 
